

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 25-1344

(Filed: September 3, 2025)

THEODORE HAUGLAND, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. *

*

THE UNITED STATES, *

*

Defendant. *

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Theodore Haugland, proceeding *pro se*, filed a complaint on August 11, 2025, seeking \$8,072,025.00 in damages “for the negligent, illegal removal of his 6th and 7th amendment rights.” Compl. [ECF 1] at 3. Mr. Haugland claims that “[t]he General Services Administration of the United States failed to secure sealed information for [another] ongoing case” filed in this Court on April 22, 2025. *Id.* at 2. He alleges that “[t]he United States was negligent with the handling of this sensitive information” and that his “personal, financial, and identity information were divulged.” *Id.* Consequently, Mr. Haugland states that “the United States illegally violated [his] 6th and 7th amendment rights.” *Id.*

The Court does not believe that it has jurisdiction over Mr. Haugland’s complaint. Although *pro se* plaintiffs are held to “less stringent standards,” they must still meet the Court’s jurisdictional requirements. *See Potter v. United States*, 161 Fed. Cl. 24, 27 (2022) (citing *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); *Minehan v. United States*, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007)); *see also Spengler v. United States*, 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Tucker Act provides the Court jurisdiction over “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, “[t]he Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action; in order to come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.” *Fisher v. United States*, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing *United States v. Mitchell*, 462 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); *United States v. Testan*, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)); *see also Gibson v. United States*, 121 Fed. Cl. 215, 217 (2015) (finding that a plaintiff must cite a money-mandating source of law to establish jurisdiction).

While Mr. Haugland states that this Court has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, [ECF 1] at 1, he does not cite a money-mandating source of law. *See* [ECF 1]. Indeed, it is well-established that the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitution are not

money-mandating sources of law. *See Vuolo v. United States*, No. 2006-5136, 2006 WL 3913417, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 29, 2006) (holding that “[t]he Court of Federal Claims correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] allegations concerning violations of the . . . Sixth [and] Seventh . . . Amendments because these amendments do not mandate the payment of money”). Moreover, to the extent Mr. Haugland’s claims allege negligence by the United States, this Court cannot assert jurisdiction over negligence claims. Negligence claims sound in tort, and, under the Tucker Act, this Court lacks jurisdiction over tort claims. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States . . . in cases *not sounding in tort.*”) (emphasis added); *see also Waller v. United States*, 767 F. App’x 989, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Negligence is a tort, and torts are explicitly excluded from the [Court of Federal Claim’s] jurisdiction.”).

Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) states that “[i]f the [C]ourt determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the [C]ourt must dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3). Accordingly, Mr. Haugland is **ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE** as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3). Mr. Haugland shall respond to this Order **on or before October 3, 2025**. If Mr. Haugland fails to respond, this case may be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute under RCFC 41(b). The government’s answer to the complaint is **STAYED** until further order of the Court.

Concurrent with his complaint, Mr. Haugland filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis*. [ECF 2]. Mr. Haugland’s motion is **GRANTED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Thompson M. Dietz
THOMPSON M. DIETZ, Judge